What constitutes a dowry death? Various amendments have been made to the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 to make the law more effective. The Pawan Kumar vs State of Haryana judgment on the dowry death of Urmil is significant in this regard
In May 1985, Urmil married Pawan Kumar and went to stay in Sonepat, Haryana. Within a few days, she returned home complaining of demands being made for dowry of a refrigerator and scooter. The demands continued and, on account of their non-fulfilment, Urmil was tortured and harassed.
In April 1987, Urmil’s maternal uncle died and she visited Delhi with her husband to offer her condolences. Pawan Kumar later returned to Sonepat and Urmil stayed on at her sister’s place in Delhi. On May 17, 1987, Pawan Kumar visited his wife, a quarrel ensued, and Urmil expressed her unwillingness to return with him. However, she did finally go back to Sonepat. The very next day, on May 18, 1987, Urmil was found dead with burn injuries, in a room full of smoke. Her parents arrived and a post-mortem was conducted. The cause of death was found to be shock and asphyxia as a result of severe burns, which were sufficient to cause death.
The trial court convicted Urmil’s husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law for dowry death under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), abetment to suicide under Section 306 of the IPC and cruelty by the husband or his relatives under Section 498-A of the IPC. The high court maintained the conviction and Urmil’s husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law were sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for dowry death and abetment to suicide, and two years for cruelty. Under appeal, the case reached the Supreme Court; the judgment is reported as Pawan Kumar versus State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309.
It was contended on behalf of the husband and in-laws that there was no evidence that just before her death, Urmil was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with a demand for dowry. It was submitted that there was neither any demand for dowry nor any agreement at the time of marriage. It was argued that unless there was an agreement for dowry at the time of marriage, or in connection with marriage, it would not fall within the definition of ‘dowry’ under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. According to the submission, merely asking for a fridge or a scooter and having a grouse due to non-fulfilment of the demand in the absence of any agreement would not constitute dowry. Therefore, the offence of dowry death under Section 304-B cannot be said to have been committed. In addition, the contention advanced was that suspicion, conjecture and surmise could not be the basis of a conviction, and that guilt had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of concrete evidence.
The court examined relevant provisions of the law to determine the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence of dowry death. It noted that two conditions had to be satisfied before the death of a woman could be termed a dowry death. The death of a woman due to burns or bodily injury, or in a manner other than under normal circumstances, should have occurred within seven years of marriage. The second requirement is that just prior to her death the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives in connection with dowry.
Applying the analysis to the case, the court observed that it was not in dispute that Urmil had died of burn injuries, that is, she did not die under normal circumstances, and that the death occurred within seven years of marriage. The court noted that Urmil’s mother had deposed that within four days of marriage her daughter had returned and told her that she was being subjected to taunts for not bringing a scooter and a refrigerator as dowry at the time of marriage. That her mother pacified her and sent her back. That Urmil came to her again, after two months, and told her that she was being continuously taunted, mistreated and called ugly for not bringing the articles as dowry. After the birth of her son, Urmil again complained of maltreatment. Her father said that he had been unable to meet his daughter’s demands and had pacified and sent her back. Urmil’s sister and brother-in-law made similar depositions.
The court examined the Dowry Prohibition Act in the context of the definition of dowry. It noted that the Act had been brought in to provide an effective check to dowry deaths, which were continuing despite the prevailing laws. The objective was to prohibit the giving and taking of dowry. At the time the Act was brought in, in 1961, dowry was defined as property given, or agreed to be given, as “consideration for the marriage,” “before or at the time of marriage”. As both dowry and dowry deaths continued despite the enactment, drastic amendments were brought in to make the law more effective.
Because it was proving difficult to prove that, in many cases, property given was “consideration for the marriage”, in 1984 the words “in connection with the marriage” were included in the definition. Similarly, in 1986, the definition of dowry was extended to include not only property at or before marriage but also that given “after the marriage”. The 1986 amendment introduced Section 304-B to the IPC, making dowry death a distinct and separate offence. The explanation to the provision specifies that dowry shall have the same meaning as in the Dowry Prohibition Act. For similar reasons, Section 498-A, making cruelty by the husband or his relatives punishable, was introduced in the IPC through an amendment in 1983.
The court then dealt with the argument that an agreement was necessary for the demand to fall within the definition of dowry. It observed that while interpreting the definition of dowry, one had to keep in mind the defect or mischief due to which the amendment had been brought in to enlarge the definition of dowry. It held that the interpretation given should further the objective for which the amendment had been made in the provision.
Section 304-B makes “demand for dowry” punishable. The court observed that a demand neither conceives nor would conceive of any agreement. If, to convict an offender, an agreement is to be proved, then hardly any offenders would fall within the provision. The deceased Urmil was tortured, mistreated and harassed within days of marriage for not bringing in the articles mentioned. Hence, the demand is in connection with the marriage.
The court noted that the demanding of dowry, directly or indirectly, from the bride’s parents, relatives or guardian had been made punishable through amendments made in 1984. The agreement referred to in the definition of dowry had to be interpreted in the context of the mandate and objective of the Act as well as the other provisions. Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act makes the giving or taking of dowry punishable. Section 4 makes the demand for dowry itself punishable. Repeated demands for articles like TVs and scooters from the bride or her parents made after marriage would fall within the category of ‘in connection with marriage’ and constitute dowry for the purpose of dowry death under Section 304-B of the IPC.
Applying it to the case, the judgment notes that there had been demands for a scooter and a fridge within a few days of Urmil’s marriage. Non-fulfilment of this demand had led to repetitive taunts and mistreatment. Observing that it was not always necessary that there exist an agreement for dowry, these demands were held to be ‘in connection with’ the marriage. The court concluded that, clearly, there was a demand for dowry falling within the definition of dowry under the Dowry Prohibition Act, and for the purpose of dowry death under Section 304-B of the IPC.
As regards the second ingredient in the offence of dowry death, the court examined whether Urmil had been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives “soon before her death”. The submission made on behalf of the accused was that there were no signs of any physical injury, nor was there any evidence from neighbours or other independent persons of cruelty towards Urmil. The court observed that mental torture in a given case could also be construed as cruelty and harassment for the purpose of dowry death under Section 304-B, and cruelty by the husband or relatives under Section 498-A. Explanation (a) of Section 498-A refers to both mental and physical cruelty. The requirement under the provision is that there should have been wilful conduct by the accused persons.
The court observed that a girl looks forward with hope and aspiration on entering a marriage, and if, from the very next day, the husband starts taunting her for not bringing in dowry and calling her ugly, then it would clearly amount to mental torture, cruelty and harassment of the bride. Just a day before her death, Urmil had quarrelled with her husband. These would all constitute wilful conduct on the part of the husband. Urmil was staying with her sister and brother-in-law who had both deposed that she told them that her husband was mistreating her in connection with the demand for dowry. She was reluctant to go back with her husband, and her parting words, on May 17, 1987, were that they may not see her face in the future. The next day she died of her burns.
The court rejected the submission that Urmil’s quarrel with her husband, the day before she died, was not connected with dowry. It noted that, under Section 8-A of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the burden of proving that the demand for dowry had not been made was on the accused person. That, under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, if it is shown that a person had treated a woman with cruelty and harassment just prior to her death then it shall be presumed that the said person has caused the dowry death.
The husband, in Urmil’s case, had produced no evidence to dispel the presumption under the law of demanding dowry and causing the dowry death. The court held that the quarrel the day before Urmil’s death and the direct evidence of her parents, sister and brother-in-law cumulatively amounted to cruelty and harassment just before death, fulfilling the requirements of Section 304-B and 498-A of the IPC. The court also held that the quarrel amounted to abetment of suicide, under Section 307 of the IPC.
The court held that there was no convincing evidence that the father-in-law or mother-in-law had subjected Urmil to cruelty. The evidence of cruelty and harassment just before death was also confined to the husband. Both the mother-in-law and father-in-law were given the benefit of the doubt and acquitted. The husband Pawan Kumar was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for dowry death under Section 304-B of the IPC, four years’ imprisonment for abetment to suicide under Section 306 of the IPC and two years’ imprisonment for cruelty under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.
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In May 1985, Urmil married Pawan Kumar and went to stay in Sonepat, Haryana. Within a few days, she returned home complaining of demands being made for dowry of a refrigerator and scooter. The demands continued and, on account of their non-fulfilment, Urmil was tortured and harassed.
In April 1987, Urmil’s maternal uncle died and she visited Delhi with her husband to offer her condolences. Pawan Kumar later returned to Sonepat and Urmil stayed on at her sister’s place in Delhi. On May 17, 1987, Pawan Kumar visited his wife, a quarrel ensued, and Urmil expressed her unwillingness to return with him. However, she did finally go back to Sonepat. The very next day, on May 18, 1987, Urmil was found dead with burn injuries, in a room full of smoke. Her parents arrived and a post-mortem was conducted. The cause of death was found to be shock and asphyxia as a result of severe burns, which were sufficient to cause death.
The trial court convicted Urmil’s husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law for dowry death under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), abetment to suicide under Section 306 of the IPC and cruelty by the husband or his relatives under Section 498-A of the IPC. The high court maintained the conviction and Urmil’s husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law were sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for dowry death and abetment to suicide, and two years for cruelty. Under appeal, the case reached the Supreme Court; the judgment is reported as Pawan Kumar versus State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309.
It was contended on behalf of the husband and in-laws that there was no evidence that just before her death, Urmil was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with a demand for dowry. It was submitted that there was neither any demand for dowry nor any agreement at the time of marriage. It was argued that unless there was an agreement for dowry at the time of marriage, or in connection with marriage, it would not fall within the definition of ‘dowry’ under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. According to the submission, merely asking for a fridge or a scooter and having a grouse due to non-fulfilment of the demand in the absence of any agreement would not constitute dowry. Therefore, the offence of dowry death under Section 304-B cannot be said to have been committed. In addition, the contention advanced was that suspicion, conjecture and surmise could not be the basis of a conviction, and that guilt had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of concrete evidence.
The court examined relevant provisions of the law to determine the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence of dowry death. It noted that two conditions had to be satisfied before the death of a woman could be termed a dowry death. The death of a woman due to burns or bodily injury, or in a manner other than under normal circumstances, should have occurred within seven years of marriage. The second requirement is that just prior to her death the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives in connection with dowry.
Applying the analysis to the case, the court observed that it was not in dispute that Urmil had died of burn injuries, that is, she did not die under normal circumstances, and that the death occurred within seven years of marriage. The court noted that Urmil’s mother had deposed that within four days of marriage her daughter had returned and told her that she was being subjected to taunts for not bringing a scooter and a refrigerator as dowry at the time of marriage. That her mother pacified her and sent her back. That Urmil came to her again, after two months, and told her that she was being continuously taunted, mistreated and called ugly for not bringing the articles as dowry. After the birth of her son, Urmil again complained of maltreatment. Her father said that he had been unable to meet his daughter’s demands and had pacified and sent her back. Urmil’s sister and brother-in-law made similar depositions.
The court examined the Dowry Prohibition Act in the context of the definition of dowry. It noted that the Act had been brought in to provide an effective check to dowry deaths, which were continuing despite the prevailing laws. The objective was to prohibit the giving and taking of dowry. At the time the Act was brought in, in 1961, dowry was defined as property given, or agreed to be given, as “consideration for the marriage,” “before or at the time of marriage”. As both dowry and dowry deaths continued despite the enactment, drastic amendments were brought in to make the law more effective.
Because it was proving difficult to prove that, in many cases, property given was “consideration for the marriage”, in 1984 the words “in connection with the marriage” were included in the definition. Similarly, in 1986, the definition of dowry was extended to include not only property at or before marriage but also that given “after the marriage”. The 1986 amendment introduced Section 304-B to the IPC, making dowry death a distinct and separate offence. The explanation to the provision specifies that dowry shall have the same meaning as in the Dowry Prohibition Act. For similar reasons, Section 498-A, making cruelty by the husband or his relatives punishable, was introduced in the IPC through an amendment in 1983.
The court then dealt with the argument that an agreement was necessary for the demand to fall within the definition of dowry. It observed that while interpreting the definition of dowry, one had to keep in mind the defect or mischief due to which the amendment had been brought in to enlarge the definition of dowry. It held that the interpretation given should further the objective for which the amendment had been made in the provision.
Section 304-B makes “demand for dowry” punishable. The court observed that a demand neither conceives nor would conceive of any agreement. If, to convict an offender, an agreement is to be proved, then hardly any offenders would fall within the provision. The deceased Urmil was tortured, mistreated and harassed within days of marriage for not bringing in the articles mentioned. Hence, the demand is in connection with the marriage.
The court noted that the demanding of dowry, directly or indirectly, from the bride’s parents, relatives or guardian had been made punishable through amendments made in 1984. The agreement referred to in the definition of dowry had to be interpreted in the context of the mandate and objective of the Act as well as the other provisions. Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act makes the giving or taking of dowry punishable. Section 4 makes the demand for dowry itself punishable. Repeated demands for articles like TVs and scooters from the bride or her parents made after marriage would fall within the category of ‘in connection with marriage’ and constitute dowry for the purpose of dowry death under Section 304-B of the IPC.
Applying it to the case, the judgment notes that there had been demands for a scooter and a fridge within a few days of Urmil’s marriage. Non-fulfilment of this demand had led to repetitive taunts and mistreatment. Observing that it was not always necessary that there exist an agreement for dowry, these demands were held to be ‘in connection with’ the marriage. The court concluded that, clearly, there was a demand for dowry falling within the definition of dowry under the Dowry Prohibition Act, and for the purpose of dowry death under Section 304-B of the IPC.
As regards the second ingredient in the offence of dowry death, the court examined whether Urmil had been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives “soon before her death”. The submission made on behalf of the accused was that there were no signs of any physical injury, nor was there any evidence from neighbours or other independent persons of cruelty towards Urmil. The court observed that mental torture in a given case could also be construed as cruelty and harassment for the purpose of dowry death under Section 304-B, and cruelty by the husband or relatives under Section 498-A. Explanation (a) of Section 498-A refers to both mental and physical cruelty. The requirement under the provision is that there should have been wilful conduct by the accused persons.
The court observed that a girl looks forward with hope and aspiration on entering a marriage, and if, from the very next day, the husband starts taunting her for not bringing in dowry and calling her ugly, then it would clearly amount to mental torture, cruelty and harassment of the bride. Just a day before her death, Urmil had quarrelled with her husband. These would all constitute wilful conduct on the part of the husband. Urmil was staying with her sister and brother-in-law who had both deposed that she told them that her husband was mistreating her in connection with the demand for dowry. She was reluctant to go back with her husband, and her parting words, on May 17, 1987, were that they may not see her face in the future. The next day she died of her burns.
The court rejected the submission that Urmil’s quarrel with her husband, the day before she died, was not connected with dowry. It noted that, under Section 8-A of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the burden of proving that the demand for dowry had not been made was on the accused person. That, under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, if it is shown that a person had treated a woman with cruelty and harassment just prior to her death then it shall be presumed that the said person has caused the dowry death.
The husband, in Urmil’s case, had produced no evidence to dispel the presumption under the law of demanding dowry and causing the dowry death. The court held that the quarrel the day before Urmil’s death and the direct evidence of her parents, sister and brother-in-law cumulatively amounted to cruelty and harassment just before death, fulfilling the requirements of Section 304-B and 498-A of the IPC. The court also held that the quarrel amounted to abetment of suicide, under Section 307 of the IPC.
The court held that there was no convincing evidence that the father-in-law or mother-in-law had subjected Urmil to cruelty. The evidence of cruelty and harassment just before death was also confined to the husband. Both the mother-in-law and father-in-law were given the benefit of the doubt and acquitted. The husband Pawan Kumar was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for dowry death under Section 304-B of the IPC, four years’ imprisonment for abetment to suicide under Section 306 of the IPC and two years’ imprisonment for cruelty under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.
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